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The ability to create and make use of new ideas and new technologies is a
factor that distinguishes the successful from the unsuccessful.' These ideas and
technologies form the basis of intellectual property. Most industrialized countries
provide national laws granting inventors and developers a monopoly over their
property for a limited time.2 However, developing countries are often reluctant
to grant intellectual property protection for fear of price increases and loss of
control over technology that is vital to national development.3 This lack of protec-
tion has often led to pirating of foreign intellectual property by companies in
lesser-developed countries.
Piracy is a form of infringement that constitutes a violation of the intellectual
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article in any not-for-
profit publication or handout provided such reproduction acknowledges original publication in this
issue of The International Lawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the author.
*J.D. Candidate 1997, Southern Methodist University; Managing Editor, Southern Methodist
University School of Law Student Editorial Board, The International Lawyer.
1. R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards, Introduction, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 1 (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards
1988) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Gadbaw & Richards)].
2. Id.
3. Stefan Kirchanski, Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing Countries: U.S. Efforts
to Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 569, 572 (1994).
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property rights that are created by national intellectual property laws.4 According
to one report, piracy of intellectual property has reached enormous proportions,
is producing serious distortions in international trade, and may in the long run
threaten future research and development activities.5 These problems are particu-
larly evident in the pharmaceutical industry, where the industry loses about $1.5
billion a year to piracy in Argentina, Brazil, and India alone.6
Because the development of new pharmaceutical products is highly expensive
and considered a risky business,7 the pharmaceutical industry has been very active
in petitioning the United States Trade Representative's Office (USTR's Office)
for increased intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals in various coun-
tries.' In February of 1996, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) listed three countries in a filing with the USTR's Office urging
inclusion on the 1996 Special 301 "priority foreign country" list: Argentina,
India, and Turkey. 9 This Comment looks at the need for increased patent protec-
tion in the pharmaceutical industry and the various multilateral and unilateral
means of negotiating with developing countries. In addition, the Comment con-
tains a brief survey of the status of intellectual property laws in the countries of
most concern to the pharmaceutical industry.
I. Patent Rights and Piracy
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
The first administrative means for granting patents occurred in Venice in the
late fifteenth century.'° Under this system, the rights to use an invention were
reserved by the republic without compensation to the inventor."' Governments
began to view technological know-how as the primary benefit to patents in the
late eighteenth century. 2 Today, providing incentives for inventive activity can
4. Gunda Schumann, Economic Development and Intellectual Property Protection in Southeast
Asia: Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Thailand, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 163 (Francis W. Rush-
ing & Carole G. Brown eds., 1990) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Rushing &
Brown)].
5. John T. Masterson, Jr., Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in International Transac-
tions, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 863 PLI/Corp 333, Practicing Law Institute.
6. Prepared Statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Research and Manu-
facturers of America, Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate July 27,
1994, Fed. News Serv. Wash. Pkg. (July 28, 1994) available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 8372760
[hereinafter Statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoffl.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 185-202 and accompanying text discussing the actions of the USTR's Office.
9. Pharmaceuticals: Pharmaceutical Group Urges Trade Action Launched Against Argentina,
India, Turkey, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Feb. 26, 1996) [hereinafter Pharmaceuticals].
10. ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 3 (1992).
11. Id. at 4 (quoting Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF.
Soc'Y 166, 177 (1948)).
12. MERGES, supra note 10, at 6.
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be accomplished in three ways: 3 the government can pay and/or employ the
inventor;14 the forces of the free market and self-protection can provide the inven-
tive incentive;' 5 or, finally, the government can grant the inventor an exclusive
right to monopolize the invention for a period of time, in exchange for disclosure
of the invention to the public.16
The U.S. patent system is a good example of providing inventors with limited
monopoly in exchange for full disclosure of their inventions. The United States
Constitution empowered Congress to establish a national patent system. 7 Today,
the U.S. patent laws, which were originally passed by Congress in May 1790,18
are codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376. The U.S. patent system provides an inventor
the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention in the
United States for a period of twenty years from the filing of the patent application.' 9
In exchange for the right of exclusion, the patent laws require full disclosure of
the invention. 20 Disclosure leads to development of further significant advances
in the art covered by the invention.2'
Patent laws worldwide vary by country, with each country implementing its
own regime of national laws to protect intellectual property.22 In most instances,
if an invention is novel, useful, and not obvious, it is patentable if it falls within
the patentable categories provided in a particular country. 23 International contro-
versy in patent law centers around the patentable categories that are recognized
13. Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round-Negotiating Strategies of the
Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1317, 1319 (1990).
14. This method is used by socialist, nonmarket economies. Id.
15. This method places the burden on the inventor to protect the inventions by secrecy. Once
imitators are able to enter the market, they can easily undercut the inventor since they can forgo
the start-up costs of product research and market development. This method is used in certain areas
of commercial activities not otherwise protected by laws. Id.
16. This method is utilized by most Western countries in most areas of commercial activities,
while it is utilized in developing countries in limited areas of commercial activities. Id.
17. DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 2-9 (1992). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
18. The Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (Apr. 10, 1790); MERGES, supra note 10,
at 7.
19. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). This became effective on June 8, 1995. Legislation: Bill Would Close
'GA77Loophole 'for Pharmaceutical Patent Holders, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA)
(Aug. 29, 1995). See also Kenneth J. Burchfield, U.S. GATT Legislation Changes Patent Term, 77
J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] On. Soc'Y 222 (1995). In addition, 35 U.S.C. § 155 provides for an
additional period for products or processes subject to regulatory review by the Federal Food and
Drug Administration.
20. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires
the inventor to provide a written description of the invention and the manner of making and using
the invention in terms that would "enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to
make and use the same."
21. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481.
22. Dru Brenner-Beck, Do as I Say, Not as I Did, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 84, 86 (1992).
23. Kirchanski, supra note 3, at 571.
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(or excluded).24 The controversy stems from the fact that developing countries
hold a different view of patent protection than do the Western industrialized
25countries.
B. DIFFERING VIEWS ON PATENT RIGHTS
The Western industrialized countries utilize a system of granting inventors the
exclusive right to exploit an invention in exchange for disclosure.26 Western
countries feel that a system of patent laws can lead to economic development."
One commentator indicates that protection of intellectual property can improve
the "size, quality, and efficiency of both the labor force and the capital stock
within a country." 28 Another commentator states that patent protection would
encourage transfer of technology among countries. 29 Some of the benefits devel-
oped countries realize are: increased investment in domestic research and develop-
ment; increased flow of new products; increased inbound investment and technol-
ogy transfer; improvements in the local knowledge base; enhanced value in patent
rights; and reduced enforcement and transaction costs. 30 Typically, Western in-
dustrialized countries spend one to three percent of their annual gross national
product on technology development; therefore, these nations believe that protec-
tion of intellectual property rights will ensure continued development of new
technology and increase overall world growth. 3 1
Many developing countries, on the other hand, see little to be gained from
strong intellectual property protection. 32 Developing countries criticize the West-
ern industrial countries' demand for intellectual property rights as being self-
24. Id.
25. Y. Kurt Chang, Special 301 and Taiwan: A Case Study ofProtecting United States Intellectual
Property in Foreign Countries, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 206, 214 (1994).
26. Emmert, supra note 13.
27. Kirchanski, supra note 3. The Western industrialized countries believe that patents encourage
the development and transfer of technology. Id. In addition, the promotion of innovative effort and
innovative output can be seen as a basic requirement for economic growth. Richard P. Rozek,
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Research and Development Decisions and Economic
Growth, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Rushing & Brown), supra note 4, at 32.
28. Rozek, supra note 27, at 40. The author lists 10 areas in which economic growth will be
seen. There will be a tendency to (1) create jobs in primary industries as well as in supporting
industries, (2) create a higher-quality labor force through on-the-job training, (3) shift jobs to higher-
productivity areas, (4) increase the capital stock of the country, (5) improve the quality of the capital
stock through innovation, (6) improve the allocation of the capital stock, (7) expand those activities
subject to economies of scale, (8) improve efficiency through a reduction in local monopoly elements,
(9) provide lower-cost methods of production for existing products, and (10) provide new products.
Id.
29. Janet H. MacLaughlin et al., The Economic Significance of Piracy, in INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY RGHTS (Gadbaw & Richards), supra note 1, at 98.
30. Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 119 (1993).
31. Brenner-Beck, supra note 22.
32. Chang, supra note 25.
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serving and hypocritical.33 In most instances, developing countries are not major
producers of intellectual property and therefore have little incentive to provide
protection.34 To many of the developing countries intellectual property is a matter
of technology transfer rather than a matter of encouraging innovation.35 These
countries feel that a free flow of technology is essential to economic development
and oppose action that impedes the movement of technology. 36 The most common
view expressed among commentators describing the view of developing countries
is that knowledge is the common property of all and should be made available
at minimal costs. 37 Intellectual property laws represent a compromise between
private and social interests, and many developing countries tend to be concerned
more with social than private interests.38 Arguments against intellectual property
rights protection of pharmaceuticals typically center around social considerations
such as avoiding price increases in health care.39 Some of the concerns expressed
by developing countries include: cultural attitudes regarding private property
rights; a lack of perceived benefits; underutilization of inventions; availability
of essential commodities; autonomy; a lack of a stimulus for "local-specific"
products; and the local political environment.4
In view of the fact that a country must consider the welfare of its own citizens
before those of foreigners, shorter terms for patent protection may be more
beneficial to the national welfare of a developing country .4 Since many devel-
oping countries produce little or no intellectual property, the creation of a national
intellectual property law would result in an increase in royalty payments to foreign
producers. 42 An additional cost to these countries would be the displacement
33. Brenner-Beck, supra note 22.
34. Tara K. Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy, 27 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 327, 330 (1993-94). A recent U.N. study showed that developed
countries hold 95 % of the patents issued in developing countries. Chang, supra note 25. In contrast,
in 1994 the American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property Law reported that the United
States grants approximately 45 % of its patents to foreign inventors. R. Carl Moy, Section ofIntellectual
Property Law, Annual Report, 1993-1994, 1994 ABA SEC. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY L. REP. 58,
available in LEXIS, ABA Library, PTCLAW File.
35. Robert P. Merges, Battle of Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and Trade, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J.
239,244 (1990). Developing countries see intellectual property protection as a disincentive to building
local research capabilities. Gutterman, supra note 30, at 92.
36. Jean M. Dettmann, GATT: An Opportunity for an Intellectual Property Rights Solution, 4
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 347, 352 (1991).
37. Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property, Technology and Economic Growth, in INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Rushing & Brown), supra note 4, at 27; see also Giunta & Shang, supra
note 34, at 330, stating that developing countries maintain a belief that "knowledge and information
are 'the common heritage of mankind' and therefore should be made available at low cost."
38. Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GAIT:
A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 253 (1989).
39. Id.
40. Gutterman, supra note 30, at 122.
41. Braga, supra note 38, at 255.
42. Id. at 256.
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of companies devoted to piracy of foreign intellectual property.43 Developing
countries claim that little or no protection of intellectual property leads to saving
the country money; promotion of local industry; help in the acquisition of technol-
ogy; and less dependency on Western industrialized countries."
Inadequate protection of intellectual property in developing countries occurs
through both lack of substantive law and lack of enforcement.45 A senior trade
official in the United States stated that "as you go around the world, what you
find is legislation on the books, but it is ineffective and doesn't provide adequate
protection. And sometimes, where they've got strong laws on the books, the
questions of enforcement get serious."46 On a substantive level, many countries
exclude protection of inventions in the areas of pharmaceuticals and agricultural
inventions. 7 An effort to add intellectual property protection in a new area would
require a developing country to modify existing laws, hire new patent examiners,
and develop new rules for governing what must be disclosed, what deserves a
patent, and what is considered an infringement of the patent.4
From an enforcement perspective, many U.S. firms have experienced a lack
of cooperation from foreign authorities in eradicating counterfeiting and infringe-
ment activities. 49 Some of the inadequacies observed include: no preliminary or
final injunctive relief; a lack of seizure and impoundment; a lack of exclusion
of infringing imports; a lack of compulsory court procedures and discovery;
inadequate civil remedies; inadequate fines or criminal penalties; unreasonably
slow enforcement procedures; systematic discrimination against foreigners by
enforcement officials; inadequate training and resources for enforcement; biased
court decisions; and officials perceived as being open to bribery or other corrupt
practices. °
C. PATENTS AND PIRACY
"Pirating" has been defined as any unauthorized and uncompensated reproduc-
tion or use of someone else's creative intellectual achievement. 5 Pirating of
43. Id.
44. Gabriel Garcia, Economic Development and the Course of Intellectual Property Protection
in Mexico, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 701, 711 (1992).
45. On a substantive level, many countries fail to recognize all three traditional areas of intellectual
property protection. In many developing countries, the intellectual property laws are not vigorously
enforced. Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 331. Developing countries typically extend patent rights
for no longer than five years. Gutterman, supra note 30, at 93.
46. James Gerstenzang, The Great Trade War Counterfeit Law Little Deterrent to "Intellectual"
Theft, L.A. TimEs, May 18, 1993.
47. Kirchanski, supra note 3, at 572.
48. Merges, supra note 35, at 240.
49. Gutterman, supra note 30, at 100.
50. Id.
51. Emmert, supra note 13 (citing Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Oppor-
tunities and Risks of a GAIT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 775 (1989)).
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patented intellectual property may include the use of a process to manufacture
one's own product or the production and/or sale of a product using one's own
brand name without authorization.52 Intellectual property owners experience a
loss from the pirating of their property in lost revenue, loss of royalties, and the
potential loss of good will from the sale of imitations and inferior products. 53 In
addition, piracy can reduce the demand for a product, which in turn can affect
production levels.54 Many estimates have been made concerning the losses attrib-
uted to pirating of intellectual property rights. But many groups complain of the
absence of recent, firm data to determine actual losses .55 Estimated losses range
from $43 billion to $61 billion a year.56
Three markets can be distinguished for pirated goods: the home country of
the pirate;57 the home country of the intellectual property owner;5" and the market
of all other countries. 59 Typical of most intellectual property laws, U.S. patent
law provides protection only against pirated goods that are produced and/or sold
in the United States or produced in foreign countries for sale in the United States. 60
Due to the national nature of the U.S. patent laws, they do not provide protection
61for the sale of pirated goods in foreign countries.
Many developing nations find that piracy of intellectual property offers eco-
nomic benefits to their country.62 Piracy provides goods and services to residents
52. Emmert, supra note 13, at 1320.
53. Anne D. Waters, Trade, Intellectual Property, and the Development of Central and Eastern
Europe: Filling the GATT Gap, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 943 (1993).
54. The European Parliament estimated that European countries lost 100,000 jobs each year
from 1988 to 1992 because the importation of counterfeit goods reduced the demand for the genuine
products produced locally. Id. at 944. In the United States it is estimated that 210,000 jobs are lost
annually because of pirated goods. Id. at 945. The U.S. auto industry has indicated that it would
employ another 210,000 people if it could put phony parts suppliers out of business. Joshua Levine
& Nancy Rotenier, Seller Beware (Sale of Counterfeit Products), FORBES, Oct. 25, 1993.
55. Gerstenzang, supra note 46.
56. Id. One source calls counterfeit merchandise "a $200 billion enterprise worldwide." Levine
& Rotenier, supra note 54.
57. The pirate has advantages over the intellectual property holder in its own country in that
the pirate can avoid shipping costs and typically has lower wage costs. Emmert, supra note 13, at
1322. In addition, a pirate can undercut the intellectual property owner on the market since the pirate
incurs no research, development, or marketing costs. Id.
58. Many U.S. firms complain that they are being undersold, even in their own country. Id.
Theoretically the strict laws on intellectual property protection should effectively keep out pirated
goods. Id. However, one estimate states that Customs only manages to seize $40 million worth of
counterfeit goods per year. Levine & Rotenier, supra note 54.
59. Many countries do not provide adequate protection. These countries either do not provide
protection for the particular product through their own intellectual property laws or they are unable
to effectively exclude goods that violate their laws. Emmert, supra note 13, at 1322.
60. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) & (g); see also Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 342.
61. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
62. Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 331.
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at prices lower than those that foreign patent holders would demand.63 Domestic
production is stimulated, providing employment for local residents. 64
II. Patents in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, president of the PhRMA, classifies pharmaceutical
innovation as a "highly expensive and risky business." 65 He states that one of
every 5000 new chemical entities discovered makes it to the market as a new
drug, and it takes an average of twelve years to discover and develop a new drug
at an average cost of $359 million.66 In addition to these costs, statistics show
that only 30 percent of the drugs that obtain United States Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) approval sell well enough recoup the average research and develop-
ment costs for a new drug.67 The high costs demonstrate the value of intellectual
property rights to pharmaceutical companies, but at the same time, they make
it difficult for developing countries to develop their own pharmaceuticals domesti-
cally. 68 A 1978 study by the FDA found that only 16 out of 172 countries had
full patent protection for pharmaceutical products and processes.69
A. PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS
Several types of patents are available to pharmaceutical companies: product
patents, composition patents, and process patents. 70 The product patent refers to
the chemical structure defining a chemical compound; 71 this typically is the end
product consumed by the consumer. In pharmaceuticals, the product patent is
the most desirable patent because it grants protection regardless of the method
used to produce the compound or the intended use of the compound.72 Composition
patents are similar to product patents in that they provide protection for a formula-
tion or mixture of chemicals.73 One difference between the two types of patents
is that mere manufacture of the ingredients is insufficient for infringement of
63. Kirsten Peterson, Recent Intellectual Property Trends in Developing Countries, 33 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 277, 280 (1992).
64. Id.
65. Statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, supra note 6.
66. Id. A recent study completed by the Center of Drug Development at Tufts University revealed
that it costs an average of $231 million to take a new drug from discovery through approval by the
Food and Drug Administration. Moy, supra note 34.
67. Statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, supra note 6.
68. James Thomas et al., Chemical Trade Prospers in the 1980's, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1,
1991, available in WESTLAW, 1991 WL 2815983.
69. Claudio R. Frischtak, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and Industrial Technol-
ogy Development in Brazil, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Rushing & Brown), supra note
4, at 89.
70. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The Need for Improved
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the product patent; the preparation or the sale of the entire formulation must also
occur. 
74
Process patents are directed at protecting the "means of obtaining" an end
result.75 Process patents protect two things: first, the process of making the prod-
uct, and second, the process of using the product to treat disease. 7 6 The first type,
the process of making the product, is patentable in many countries. 7  However,
policing such patents is difficult unless the process is the only economically
feasible process to create the end product. 78 Typically many different processes
may make the same chemical compound. 79 In order for a patentee to prove in-
fringement of a process patent, it must show that the compound was made using
the exact chemical steps of the patented process. 8° Thus, this method provides
little protection to the inventor of a pharmaceutical product.8' If a company is
infringing the process in a country where the process is not patented, the patentee
has little recourse to prevent the sale of the product in countries where the process
is patented.
82
The second type of process patent, the process of using the product, is also
difficult to enforce, especially where the process relies on a compound not itself
patentable. 3 In these cases, a would-be infringer can simply substitute a competi-
tor's similar compound to avoid infringement of the process.8
4
A random sample taken of 100 U.S. industrial firms showed that lack of patent
protection in the pharmaceutical industry would have resulted in a reduction of
the introduced inventions by 65 percent and a reduction in the development of
inventions by 60 percent during the time period from 1981 to 1983.85 These
numbers were the highest percentages of the twelve industries represented. 6 In
74. Id.
75. Alan Wright, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Process Patent
Protection, 43 AM. U.L. REv. 603, 606 (1994).
76. Thomas G. Field, Jr., Pharmaceuticals and Intellectual Property: Meeting the Needs
Throughout the World, 31 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 3, 7 (1990).
77. Mossinghoff, supra note 70.
78. Field, supra note 76, at 8.
79. Mossinghoff, supra note 70.
80. Id.
81. Timothy J. Richards, Argentina, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RiGHTS (Gadbaw &Richards),
supra note 1, at 109, 131; see also Mossinghoff, supra note 70, at 311. The Argentine Supreme
Court ruled that a patent directed to a pharmaceutical process, which was used to create a rare product
only obtainable through one process, was the equivalent of a product patent and thus unenforceable.
Id. at 312.
82. Field, supra note 76, at 8.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Mansfield, supra note 37, at 24.
86. Other industries included: chemicals (30% would not be introduced, 38% would not be
developed); petroleum (18% would not be introduced, 25% would not be developed); machinery
(15% would not be introduced, 17% would not be developed); fabricated metals (12% would not
be introduced, 12% would not be developed); primary metals (8% would not be introduced, 1%
would not be developed); electrical equipment (4% would not be introduced, 11% would not be
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the same study the top five industries (pharmaceuticals, chemicals, petroleum,
machinery, and fabricated metals) indicated that 80 percent of their patentable
inventions were patented.
B. PIRACY OF PHARMACEUTICALS
The piracy of Feldene, Pfizer's best-selling anti-arthritic drug, demonstrates
how quickly the pharmaceutical industry becomes a victim to piracy.a Edmund
Pratt, Jr., Pfizer's chairman, stated that it took "$125 million and 10 years for
Pfizer to develop Feldene, but there were four imitations already in Argentina
even before we introduced the product.' 8 9 A 1987 survey found twelve Thai
companies producing generic products based on the Feldene formula.9a Another
example is a Thai company's copy of Smith-Kline Beckman's Tagamet; the origi-
nal Tagamet costs $1.68 per daily dose compared to the counterfeit version that
sells for only $0.61 per daily dose.91 Jean-Frangois Gaulis, a director of the
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations, calls the
problem of piracy in the industry a "life and death problem." 92
The fears surrounding the pirated drugs are understandable. As one author
stated, "[i]t may be simple to make an ulcer pill with the same color and markings
as the original. It may or may not be simple to make the pill with the same active
ingredient and absorption rate." 9 3 The principal dangers of pirated medicines
are in three areas: the dosage is incorrect, the contents are incorrect, or the drug
provides no medical benefit whatsoever. 94 These problems lead to under-
or overdosing of medications or complications from entirely different toxic com-
pounds .9
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association estimated in 1986 that piracy
developed); instruments (1% would not be introduced, 1% would not be developed); and office
equipment, motor vehicles, rubber, and textiles (each of which reported that there would be no
change in introduction or development). Id.
87. Id. at 26.
88. Eduardo Lachica, Trade Thievery U.S. Companies Curb Pirating of Some Items But by No
Means All, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1989.
89. Id.
90. Id. In 1984 U.S. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association members sold $29 million worth
of patented products in Korea; during the same year, pirates sold $70 million worth of the same
products in Korea. Rozek, supra note 27, at 39. In addition, one estimate states that 70% of the
drugs sold in Africa are counterfeit. UK: Counterfeiting-Fake's Progress, Mgmt. Today (Reuter)
(July 7, 1990), available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File [hereinafter Fake's Progress].
91. Gutterman, supra note 30, at 136. The counterfeit version also competes with 25 generic
versions that can sell for as little as $0.34 per daily dose. Id.
92. Stronger Action Called for on Counterfeit Medicines, PHARMACEUTICAL Bus. NEWS FIN.
TIMES BUS. INFO., LTD., Jan. 24, 1992, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 2207186 [hereinafter
Stronger Action].
93. Levine & Rotenier, supra note 54.
94. Stronger Action, supra note 92.
95. Id.
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accounted for $6.4 billion in yearly losses worldwide for the U.S. drug industry.96
Other estimates have ranged from $2 billion97 to $5 billion annually. 98 Further
estimates indicate that the European drug companies lose at least 50 million
British pounds a year to piracy. 99 The estimated losses are usually calculated
based on the estimated number of pirated copies sold multiplied by the cost of
the item from the patent holder or a licensee. 1' ° These numbers are typically
considered to be inflated.'°1 If consumers had to buy the protected goods at a
price several times higher than the price of the pirated good, the volume of sales
would most likely shrink.'" The most accurate guide would be the otherwise
unexplained downturn in the sales or revenue of the patent holder. 103
C. OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS OF THE INDUSTRY
Another area in which the pharmaceutical companies encounter problems is
the application of compulsory licensing.'°4 Compulsory licensing is provided
when a patent holder does not utilize 05 the patented product or process within
the borders of the country within a certain period of time.'06 The government is
then allowed to grant a compulsory license to others for the use of the patented
item. 107 In many developing countries where importation of the drug is not consid-
ered utilization of the product,'0 8 production of the product in the country is
required. Production in a particular country is problematic in the pharmaceutical
industry because production involves environmental, safety, and regulatory prob-
lems.'09 Pharmaceutical companies cannot afford to build a chemical manufactur-
ing plant in each country in which their products are marketed. "o
The pharmaceutical industry is also concerned with the existence of pipeline
protection in countries with new patent laws for pharmaceuticals. Pipeline protec-
tion requires a country with new intellectual property laws to extend patent protec-
tion to products already patented in other nations for the remainder of their patent
96. Gerstenzang, supra note 46.
97. Thomas, supra note 68.
98. Levine & Rotenier, supra note 54.
99. Fake's Progress, supra note 90.
100. Chang, supra note 25, at 225.
101. Fake's Progress, supra note 90.
102. Chang, supra note 25, at 225; see also Fake's Progress, supra note 90.
103. Fake's Progress, supra note 90.
104. Mossinghoff, supra note 70, at 312.
105. Utilization of a patented process or product is frequently referred to as working the patent
in many foreign countries.
106. Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 344.
107. Id.
108. Mossinghoff, supra note 70, at 312. This approach furthers the desire of developing countries
to provide incentive for local manufacture of goods. Gutterman, supra note 30, n.25.
109. Mossinghoff, supra note 70, at 312.
110. Id.
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terms. "' Pipeline protection was not included in the Draft Texts on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPs agreement) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).'12 Pipeline protection has, however,
been included in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 1 3
Parallel importation enables goods to be distributed without resort to the distri-
bution channels authorized by the original manufacturer. 1 4 Goods subject to
parallel importation are often referred to as gray market goods.1H 5 The parallel
importer purchases authentic goods from the owner of an intellectual property
right and imports these products to a country where they are sold in direct competi-
tion with the owner or its authorized agent. 116 Since the goods are authentic, the
ultimate consumer is unaware that the product is not being distributed by its
manufacturer and consequently that manufacturer warranties do not apply. 117 The
debate over parallel importing centers around the conflict between protection of
intellectual property and the promotion of free trade. 118 A ban on parallel importa-
tion would ensure that manufacturers and their authorized agents receive maxi-
mum profits from the sale of their goods. 1 9
In February of 1996 the PhRMA asked for three countries to be listed as
priority foreign countries under the Special 301 provision of the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988: 120 Argentina, India, and Turkey. 12' The coun-
tries that the PhRMA would cite as priority watch list countries include Brazil,
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, China, Indonesia, Israel, Japan,
Korea, New Zealand, and Thailand. 122 In addition, the PhRMA would cite Austra-
lia, Bahrain, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, Ecua-
dor, Egypt, the European Union, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Leba-
non, Mexico, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia,
t11. Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection in an Age of
Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465, 478 (1994).
112. Id. at 479. For a discussion of GATT, see infra notes 144-60 and accompanying text.
113. Doane, supra note 111, at 479. For a discussion on NAFTA, see infra notes 161-72 and
accompanying text.
114. Manufacturers use control over the distribution channels to help control and detect counter-
feiting. Singapore Patent Bill Criticized, 7 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. No. 1, 1995, at 32.
115. See generally George Y. Gonzalez, An Analysis of the Legal Implications of the Intellectual
Property Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 305, 306
(1993).
116. Id.
117. Shashank Upadhye, Rewriting the Lanham Trademark Act to Prohibit the Importation of All
Gray Market Goods, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 59, 91 (1996).
118. Soojin Kim, In Pursuit of Profit Maximization by Restricting Parallel Imports: The U.S.
Copyright Owner and Taiwan Copyright Law, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 205, 211 (1995).
119. Id.
120. For general information concerning the Special 301 provisions, see infra notes 190-202 and
accompanying text.
121. Pharmaceuticals, supra note 9.
122. Id.
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Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Vietnam as watch list
countries. "'
M. Addressing the Protection of Intellectual Property in
Developing Countries
A. MULTILATERAL OPTIONS
The expansion of international trade recently has heightened the importance
of intellectual property protection in trade and development discussions. 24 Reso-
lution of the debate over intellectual property has been a goal of several multilateral
negotiation efforts.1 25 The three primary agreements discussed here are the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the GATT, and the NAFTA.
1. WIPO
The WIPO is the traditional multilateral forum for intellectual property. 26 The
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization was signed
at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. 127 WIPO's tasks include administering the Paris
Convention121 (on industrial property) and the Berne Convention 29 (on literary
works). WIPO is a U.N. agency with headquarters in Geneva; 30 it publishes
two monthly journals 3' and provides legal and technical assistance as well as
educational and training programs in all areas of intellectual property. 32 Article
V of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization
makes membership available to any state that is a member of the Unions, 133 a
123. Id.
124. Gutterman, supra note 30, at 104.
125. Id.
126. Merges, supra note 35, at 239.
127. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 563
(1990).
128. Id. The Paris Convention, originally established in Paris in 1883, is the oldest industrial
property law. It includes provisions relating to inventions, trade names, trademarks, service marks,
industrial designs, utility models, indications of source, appellations, or origin, and the repression
of unfair competition. Id. at 17. In May of 1993 the Paris Convention had 108 member nations.
Gerstenzang, supra note 46.
129. LEAFFER, supra note 127, at 563. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works entered into force on December 5, 1887, and its scope covers every production in
the literary, scientific, and artistic domain, whatever the mode or form of expression. Id. at 339.
In May 1993 the Berne Convention had 95 member nations. Gerstenzang, supra note 46.
130. Gerstenzang, supra note 46.
131. The journals are Copyright and Industrial Property.
132. LEAFFER, supra note 127, at 563.
133. Id. at 568. Article 2(vii) defines Unions as the "Paris Union, the Special Unions and
Agreements established in relation with that Union, the Berne Union, and any other international
agreement designed to promote the protection of intellectual property whose administration is assumed
by the Organization." Id. at 566.
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member of the United Nations,]3 or any state that is invited by the U.N. General
Assembly to become a party to the convention. 3 ' As of May of 1993, WIPO
had a membership of 132 nations. 36
The primary role of WIPO is to provide influence and guidance. 137 WIPO can
assist parties who litigate infringement cases, but has no enforcement powers of
its own. 13' A common complaint among developed countries is that WIPO has
come under the influence of the developing countries and has been hampered in
its ability to implement broader protection. 139
A WIPO committee has drafted a treaty on the Harmonization of Patent Laws.'
One controversial provision would require patent protection for all fields of tech-
nology, including pharmaceuticals. 14' The debates on the treaty were postponed
in 1993 at the request of the United States. 142 While the United States has supported
the general concept of harmonization of patent laws, controversy has sparked




The GATT was founded in 1947 to oversee the negotiation of international
rules governing trade.'" The agreement was originally signed as a temporary
134. Id. at 568. Membership includes any state that is a member of the specialized agencies
brought into relationship with the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, or any
state that is a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Id.
135. Id.
136. Gerstenzang, supra note 46.
137. Carolyn S. Corn, Pharmaceutical Patents in Brazil: Is Compulsory Licensing the Solution?
9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 71, 74 (1991).
138. James Gerstenzang, 'Intellectual' Pirates Rip off U.S. Creativity, SEATTLE TIMES, May 24,
1993, at Al. Article 28 was added to the Paris Convention in 1967 to provide for dispute settlement
on an international level. Emmert, supra note 13, at 1342. Due to fundamental difficulties, such as
judges who lack expertise in intellectual property matters and the lack of acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction, there has not been a single proceeding since 1967. Id. at 1343 (citations omitted). Even
if the Paris Convention dispute settlement were used, it would be difficult to enforce a judgment
since it can only be enforced by voluntary cooperation or by referral to the Security Council, which
would "almost certainly not" enforce a judgment regarding intellectual property. Monique L.
Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y 121, 132 (1994).
139. Merges, supra note 35, at 239. These complaints led to stronger intellectual property rights
under the GATT provisions. Id. at 240.
140. Corn, supra note 137, at 74.
141. Id.
142. Bruce A. Lehman, Intellectual Property Under the Clinton Administration, 27 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 395, 398 (1993-94).
143. Gutterman, supra note 30, at 105. Several changes would have to be made to the U.S. patent
laws in order for the United States to take part in this treaty. Id. The primary change would be the
reward granted by the U.S. patent laws for the first-to-invent, as opposed to the first-to-file for patent
rights. Id. In 1993 it was unclear what consensus there would be in the United States for this change.
Lehman, supra note 142. In January of 1994, U.S. Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown ended
the hope of harmonization of U.S. patent laws when he announced that the United States would
maintain its first-to-invent system. Richard W. Pritchard, The Future Is Now-The Case for Patent
Harmonization, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 291 (1995).
144. Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 1, at 29.
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agreement to protect tariff negotiations until the International Trade Organization
came into existence.' 45 GATT has the reputation of being "an institution capable
of bringing together conflicting interests, obtaining agreements, and then adminis-
tering those agreements." 46 The U.S. rejection of the International Trade Organi-
zation Charter led many countries to view GATT as an asset that the world was
not prepared to lose. 147
Most developed countries agree that intellectual property protection is a trade
issue. 148 Intellectual property rights were first considered as a part of the GATT
agenda in September of 1986 at the start of the Uruguay Round.' 49 Through the
insistence of the United States and consensus by the European Union and Japan,
the Uruguay Round produced the TRIPs agreement in November of 1990.150 After
seven years of deadlock over international intellectual property protection, '1 the
Uruguay Round ended on December 15, 1993, with tougher patent protection and
stronger rules against counterfeit goods. 1 52 The TRIPs agreement was included in
the Final Act of the Uruguay Round.153
The intellectual property standards found in the TRIPs agreement are fairly
high, but the agreement does consider lesser-developed countries by allowing
for delay in implementation.54 Developing countries that did not provide product
patent protection for pharmaceuticals were given a ten-year period in which to
implement patent protection.1 55 Harvey E. Bale, Jr., senior vice president of
the Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers, supported implementation of the
Uruguay Round in the United States, but called the ten-year implementation time
for developing countries "regrettable.'
' 56
One advantage of the TRIPs agreement is the establishment of the Council for
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.1 57 The Council will moni-
tor and manage administrative issues of the TRIPs agreement and provide assis-
tance to GATT members in the context of dispute settlement procedures. 58 The
TRIPs agreement also provides enforcement mechanisms, such as injunctions,
145. R. Michael Gadbaw & Rosemary E. Gwynn, Intellectual Property Rights in the New GA7T
Round, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Gadbaw & Richards), supra note 1, at 38, 42.
146. Emmert, supra note 13, at 1344 (citation omitted).
147. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 145.
148. Corn, supra note 137, at 83.
149. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 145, at 38.
150. Chang, supra note 25, at 227.
151. Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 335.
152. Roger Cohen, GATT Talks End with Cheers/117 Nations Approve Global Trade Pact After
7 Years of Negotiations, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 16, 1993, at Al.
153. See Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 335.
154. Chang, supra note 25, at 228.
155. The additional time was also allowed for implementation of patent systems for areas such
as agricultural chemicals and foodstuffs. Lehman, supra note 142, at 410.
156. Special 301: Industry Urges Special 301 Citations for China, India, Argentina, Int'l Trade
Daily (BNA) (June 27, 1994) [hereinafter Industry Urges].
157. Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 336.
158. Id.
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damages, and methods of obtaining evidence.1 59 At this time it remains unclear
how stringently these provisions will be enforced.60
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established with the signing of
the Uruguay Round of negotiation of GATT161 to implement the GATT provi-
sions. 162 Part II of the Uruguay Round Final Act includes the WTO agreement
and its annexes. 163 The WTO integrates many Uruguay Round and previous GATT
agreements into a single legal framework. 164 One of the provisions that has been
included in the WTO annexes is the TRIPs agreement.165 To be a contracting
member of the WTO, a country must: "(i) [be a] signator[y] of the GATT;
(ii) agree to adhere to all of the provisions of the Uruguay Round; and (iii) submit
schedules of market access commitments for industrial goods, agricultural goods
and services. "166
Responsibility for dispute resolution under the WTO rests with the General
Council.' 67 The General Council is made up of representatives of the member
countries and has certain executive authority as well as responsibility for the
day-to-day functions of the WTO. 168 The Dispute Settlement Body is a special
meeting of the General Council. 169 The dispute resolution provisions of the WTO
vary by agreement, but essentially include provisions for consultation, investiga-
tion, appellate review, decision adoption, implementation, and binding arbitration
(when all parties to the dispute agree). 170 The WTO provides that governments
must use multilateral procedures wherever applicable.' 7' This provision may
cause the United States conflict with the use of its Super 301 actions.1
71
3. NAFTA
The NAFTA was completed on August 12, 1992, by Canada, the United States,
and Mexico and controls the trade of goods and services among the signatory
159. Id. at 338.
160. Id.
161. William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements,
19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 427, 428 (1995).
162. Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 337.
163. Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World Trade?
16 MICH J. INT'L L. 349, 357 (1995).
164. Judith H. Bello & Mary E. Footer, Symposium: Uruguay Round-GAT/WTO, Preface, 29
INT'L LAW. 335, 340 (1995).
165. See generally id. at 341.
166. Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 337.
167. Dillon, supra note 163, at 363.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 368.
171. Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 339.
172. Id.
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countries.173 While these three countries are the first members of the agreement,
an accession clause will allow additional countries to join upon unanimous ap-
proval by the existing NAFTA countries.' 74 Some commentators view the NAFTA
provisions for patent protection as being consistent with the requirements of the
Uruguay Round of GATT;175 however, most consider the NAFTA provisions to
be a higher standard. 1
76
The NAFTA provision for patent protection of pharmaceutical products is
consistent with the requirements of the Uruguay Round of GATT. A number of
provisions in the NAFTA impact the patenting, manufacture, import, licensing,
and sale of pharmaceuticals:177 (1) each country must provide equal treatment
to foreign nationals as compared to its own citizens;'78 (2) the countries are
allowed to exclude many biotechnological inventions from patentability; 7 9
(3) the agreement calls for pipeline patent protection for pharmaceuticals; 80
(4) no discrimination regarding the site of the manufacture of the product is
allowed;'18 (5) compulsory licenses are prohibited unless they meet strict condi-
tions; 82 (6) patent terms may be extended to compensate for delays in regulatory
173. Developments in Canadian Law Relating to Food, Drugs, Devices, and Cosmetics as of
December 1992, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 323, 332 (1994) [hereinafter Developments in Canadian
Law]. Operation under NAFTA commenced on January 1, 1994. Jeffrey L. Thompson, The North
American Patent Office? A Comparative Look at the NAFTA, the European Community, and the
Community Patent Convention, 27 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 501 (1993-94).
174. Venezuela, Chile, and Argentina are expected to be the next countries to join the agreement.
Thompson, supra note 173, at 504.
175. NAFTA: Canada Is Loser on Dispute Process Created Under NAFTA, Howe Study Says,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Aug. 9, 1994).
176. The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act: Statement as to How NAFTA
Achieves Congressional Negotiating Objectives, available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 561221
(N.A.F.T.A.); see also Richard B. Bilder, Book Note, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 668,670 (1995) (reviewing
JUDITH H. BELLO ET AL., NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A NEW
FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS (1994)), calling the NAFTA
provisions the "most satisfactory protection of intellectual property rights to date" and concluding
that the TRIPs agreement unfortunately falls short of the NAFTA intellectual property provisions.
177. Developments in Canadian Law, supra note 173, at 333.
178. As an example, Canada must treat medicines researched and developed offshore the same
as those that were researched and developed within its borders. Id. at 333.
179. The provisions allow for exclusion of "plants and animals other than microorganisms" and
also for "essential biological processes for the production of plants or animals." Many biotechnologi-
cal inventions will fall within these areas. Id.
180. Specifically, the provision provides that each country must provide patent protection for
pharmaceutical products by January 1, 1992. If a country fails to provide protection by January 1,
1992, then it is required to provide patent protection for the unexpired term of the pharmaceutical
patent granted by another signatory country, so long as the pharmaceutical has not been marketed
in the country that lacks protection. Id. at 334.
181. Patents must be made available and patent rights enjoyed without discrimination whether
products are imported or locally produced. Id.
182. Some of the conditions required are (1) a license from the patent owner must first have been
sought on reasonable commercial terms; (2) a license must be granted to supply predominantly the
domestic market; (3) a license must be terminated if the conditions leading to the license cease to
exist; (4) the patent owner is to be paid an adequate fee for the license; and (5) the license cannot
be granted for the sole purpose of exploitation of another patent. Id.
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approval processes; 8 3 and (7) confidential information will be protected in phar-
maceutical files. 184
B. UNILATERAL ACTION
The United States has passed two significant acts to provide retaliation for
"unfair trade." 8 5 Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides U.S. firms
with protection from unfair competition relating to imports. 8 6 When products
that violate intellectual property rights of U.S. firms or individuals are imported
into the United States, section 337 comes into play. 18 7 Under section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974, the U.S. administration can take action against inadequate
protection of intellectual property rights occurring in other countries188 and against
trading partners who engage in "unfair competition. 89
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 expanded section 301
actions.'90 Under new section 301, called Super 301 ,' ' the USTR has the power
to determine which countries to investigate and retaliate against.' 92 Further amend-
ments to section 301 resulted in a permanent trade law called Special 301.1'3 The
purpose of Special 301 is to provide development of an overall strategy to ensure
that intellectual property rights are adequately and effectively protected. '94
Under Special 301 the USTR identifies foreign countries that deny "adequate
and effective protection of intellectual property rights." '95 These countries are
183. Id. at 335.
184. Id.
185. Ashoka Mody, New International Environmentfor Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Rushing & Brown), supra note 4, at 219.
186. Id. The Act's mandate calls for protection over a broad area of unfair competition, but it
has primarily been used for protection against infringement of intellectual property. Id.
187. Id. Section 337 cases are filed before the United States International Trade Commission. A
violation under § 337 results in the banning of the infringing product from the U.S. markets until
a licensing agreement can be reached with the intellectual property holder. Id. at 221.
188. Id. at 219. Section 301 was seen as a direct result of dissatisfaction within Congress with
protection of U.S. trade under GATT. Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating
Long Term Copyright Protection for U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
29, 33 (1995).
189. Newby, supra note 188, at 33. The Act did not provide a definition of unfairness; however,
the 1973 House report on the Trade Act of 1974 defined "unjustifiable" actions as "restrictions
which are illegal under international law or inconsistent with international obligations." Marc A.
Moyer, Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: A Formidable Weapon
in the War Against Economic Espionage, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 178, 192 (1994).
190. Newby, supra note 188, at 34. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 specifi-
cally finds that "international protection of intellectual property rights is vital to the international
competitiveness of United States persons that rely on protection of intellectual property rights."
Chang, supra note 25, at 208 (citation omitted).
191. Mody, supra note 185, at 221.
192. Newby, supra note 188, at 34; see also Mody, supra note 185, at 221.
193. Newby, supra note 188, at 34. The provisions for Special 301 can be found in 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2411-2420 (1988).
194. Chang, supra note 25, at 208.
195. Id. (citation omitted).
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listed as "Priority Foreign Countries" and reported in the Federal Register. 196
A priority foreign country is a country
(1) that has the most "onerous or egregious" practices that deny protection or equitable
market access; (2) whose practices have the "greatest adverse impact," either actual
or potential, on the relevant U.S. products; or (3) that is not engaging in good faith
negotiations to provide effective protection of intellectual property rights. 117
The USTR also publishes two additional lists, the priority watch list and the
watch list. 198
Within thirty days of identifying priority foreign countries the USTR must
initiate investigations into the acts of these countries.'99 At the close of these
six-month investigations, 2°° the USTR is authorized to retaliate. 20' The three main
retaliation efforts invoked are suspensions of trade benefits, imposition of duties
or other import restrictions, and entering binding agreements committing the
country to stop the offending practices or provide compensatory trade benefits.2o2
C. MULTILATERAL VERSUS BILATERAL OPTIONS
Unilateral action leads to bilateral negotiation with developing countries. In
the short run, bilateral action has proven to be more effective than multilateral
action.20 3 A study by the Institute for International Economics has shown that
the use of section 301 unilateral action has led to at least partially successful
negotiation in thirty-five of seventy-two cases studied. °4 While multilateral
agreements are theoretically preferable, bilateral agreements provide several ad-
196. Newby, supra note 188, at 35.
197. Id. at 35. The statute requires that the USTR confer with the Register of Copyrights, the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, and other "appropriate officers of the Federal govern-
ment" to identify priority foreign countries. Id. at 36. The USTR also considers additional available
sources and information provided by interested parties or persons. Id. The PhRMA frequently petitions
the USTR with a list of countries that it feels should be included in the official lists. See supra note
120 and accompanying text.
198. These lists are not required by statute, but alert the foreign countries that their practices are
being monitored by the USTR. Newby, supra note 188, at 36. A country placed on the priority
watch list is given 150 days to pursue accelerated action plans. Chang, supra note 25, at 209.
199. Chang, supra note 25, at 209; see also Newby, supra note 188, at 36.
200. A three-month extension can be obtained. Chang, supra note 25, at 209.
201. Id.
202. Newby, supra note 188, at 38. Retaliation efforts are usually required, with two exceptions:
(1) when an arbitration committee (under a bilateral agreement dispute resolution committee) deter-
mines that the practices do not impair U.S. trade benefits or do not violate U.S. rights; and (2) when
the USTR finds (a) that the country has taken, or agreed to take, measures to correct the practice,
(b) it is not possible for the country to take measures to correct, but compensatory trade benefits
will be provided to the United States, (c) action against the country would have a greater adverse
effect on the U.S. economy, or (d) action against the country would cause serious harm to U.S.
national security. Id.
203. Mody, supra note 185, at 225.
204. John Gero & Kathleen Lannan, Trade and Innovation: Unilateralism v. Multilateralism, 21
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 81, 88 (1995).
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vantages. °5 First, typically, fewer parties lead to faster negotiations.2 °6 In addi-
tion, bilateral agreements are more flexible in addressing economic problems. 2° 7
A major advantage of bilateral agreements is that success is possible without the
threat of multilateral deadlock. 20 8 Bilateral agreements can also have the potential
of breaking the stranglehold of special pirate interests on foreign legislative
bodies. 2°
Bilateral negotiation has proven to be most effective in newly industrialized
countries such as Korea, Hong Kong, Brazil, and Thailand.210 However, devel-
oping countries tend to resent the United States' determining what statutory re-
gimes are in their best interests.21' Consider how we, the citizens of the United
212States, would react to another country telling us what laws we should adopt.
In addition to resentment from developing countries, most of the United States'
trading partners, including those from industrialized countries, have protested
against the use of Special 301.213 The primary complaint is that the use of unilateral
action destroys attempts to maintain a balanced world trading system through
multilateral negotiations.214 Use of unilateral options such as Special 301 could
tend to undermine the effectiveness of multilateral agreements such as TRIPs.2 15
One commentator has stated that the United States should encourage behavior
that all nations will find acceptable for years to come because the United States
may not always be among the world's top trading powers.216
D. PRIVATE INDUSTRY OPTIONS
Private pharmaceutical companies can protect themselves from pirating of
patented goods by implementing a system of nondisclosure within the company.
2 17
205. Senator Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case for Bilateral Agreements, 22 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (1989).
206. Id. The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement took about 16 months to negotiate, while the
GATT rounds took many years. Id. at 8. See also Mody, supra note 185, at 225, indicating that
bilateralism is quicker and allows for more focused and tailored responses.
207. Bilateral negotiations can be used to address problems ranging from exchange rate fluctuations
to inadequate distribution systems. Baucus, supra note 205, at 8.
208. Nations that are unwilling to negotiate can be sidestepped by the United States. Id.
209. Merges, supra note 35, at 244. By placing larger national interests at risk during the negotia-
tions, larger economic players can offset political influence held by pirate groups. Id.
210. Id. at 241. This success is primarily because the United States can place intellectual property
rights in a larger trade context to threaten vital interests such as market access. Id.
211. Newby, supra note 188, at 51.
212. Chang, supra note 25, at 223. The United States would not respond well to other nations
deciding that U.S. trade practices violated the other nations' ideas of fair trade. Newby, supra note
188, at 52.
213. Newby, supra note 188, at 52.
214. Id. India, Japan, France, and Brazil have been the most vocal opponents of Special 301.
But interestingly, France has pressed for a European equivalent of Special 301. The United States
would probably not support this idea. Id.
215. Chang, supra note 25, at 228.
216. Newby, supra note 188, at 53.
217. Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 342.
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This system would require implementation of internal programs that identify
commercially valued rights, prevent disclosure of the information outside of the
company, and limit its disclosure within the company.218 This form of operation,
using trade secrets, 1 9 can be effective, but problems arise with former employees,
distributors, contractors, and joint venture partners.220 In addition, the use of
trade secrets, as opposed to patenting the products, negates the policy reasons
behind a system of patent rights.22'
Private industry must act to educate itself on the various intellectual property
laws worldwide. Many countries mandate that intellectual property may not
be protected within their borders if it has been utilized or disclosed elsewhere
within a specific period of time without first being registered for protection under
their national laws. 223 To learn of these various laws, companies can utilize the
information services of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service
(US&FCS). 224 The US&FCS obtains information on intellectual property laws,
regulations, and enforcement practices from officers stationed overseas. 225 Com-
panies should also work together, through trade associations or coalitions, to
encourage their governments to seek stronger foreign intellectual property laws
and effective enforcement of these laws.226
An additional option for pharmaceutical companies is to encourage foreign
countries to strengthen their intellectual property rights by investing in the coun-
22try. 27 Studies have suggested that countries that have received increased shares
of pharmaceutical research and development expenditures from U.S. firms have
218. Id.
219. A trade secret is a secret that derives "economic value ... from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons." It also "is the subject
of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain secrecy." CHISUM & JACOBS,
supra note 17, at 1-4 (citing the Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)).
220. The Commerce Department emphasizes that exporters should have an effective program for
preserving the confidentiality of their trade secrets. Masterson, supra note 5.
221. The primary policy reason given for the patent laws is the advantage gained by disclosure
of the information that can lead to additional innovations in the art. Trade secrets prevent disclosure
of information. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
222. Companies should avoid the idea that "one agreement fits all countries." Masterson, supra
note 5; see also Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 342.
223. Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 342. The United States prevents patents on information
that has been patented or described in a printed publication in a foreign country (or the United States)
prior to one year before the filing of a patent application within the United States. 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1995). Companies should be aware that some countries operate under an absolute novelty
rule; in other words, any public disclosure (either in printed material or offering for sale) can operate
as a bar to patent protection. Masterson, supra note 5.
224. The US&FCS is a branch of the International Trade Administration of the Department of
Commerce. Masterson, supra note 5.
225. Id.
226. Id. In addition, foreign industry should encourage its government to adopt a constructive
approach to intellectual property protection, rather than adopting an inflexible position. Giunta &
Shang, supra note 34, at 344.
227. Private agreements can create an incentive for local industries to urge their government to
strengthen laws to prevent piracy. Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 345.
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responded by increasing intellectual property protection.228 Indeed, the promise
by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry to increase investment in research and devel-
opment in Thailand was persuasive in Thailand's decision to grant pharmaceutical
229
protection.
Increased interest in the economic potential of the world's rain forests has
suggested that developing countries have important resources that need protec-
tion. 230 The pharmaceutical industry has a heightened interest in rain forests and
their potential for producing medicinal plants.231 In 1991 one of the world's largest
pharmaceutical companies, Merck & Co., announced an agreement with the
National Institute of Biodiversity of Costa Rica.232 Under the agreement local
people are trained and paid to gather plants and materials that are collected and
screened for possible medicinal purposes; in exchange, Merck & Co. has agreed
to give the Costa Ricans a share of the royalties from a successfully marketed
drug that results from the Costa Rican research, to be used for conservation of
the rain forests.233 By protecting a foreign country's natural resources, providing
job opportunities for preliminary testing, and conditioning further compensation
on the patenting and sale of a product, the foreign country has a financial incentive
to preserve its forests and also take part in the intellectual property enterprise. 234
IV. Survey of the Status of Pharmaceutical Protection in
Various Countries
A. ARGENTINA
Until recently, the law in Argentina, which had not been revised since 1864,235
provided protection for pharmaceutical processes, but not for pharmaceutical
products.236 Hence, Argentina has been listed on one of the USTR's Special 301
lists every year since 1989.237 In addition, the laws in Argentina previously re-
228. Peterson, supra note 63, at 281 (citations omitted).
229. Kirchanski, supra note 3, at 578. Unfortunately, this promise may be only illusory; the
pharmaceutical industry may choose to work patents in Thailand only because of the Thai patent
act's compulsory licensing provision. Id.
230. See Peterson, supra note 63, at 277.
231. Id.
232. William Booth, U.S. Drug Firm Signs up to Farm Tropical Forests; Costa Ricans to Prospect
for Possible Products, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1991, at A03.
233. The agreement provides the Costa Rican organization $1 million for the right to screen
plants, microbes, and insects gathered in the forests and provides the Costa Ricans a share of the
royalties of a marketable drug produced from their research. Id.
234. Peterson, supra note 63.
235. Eric Ehrmann, Another Giant Sucking Sound: Lost Royalties, Licensing Fees, American
Firms Lose $60 Billion Annually to Patent Pirates, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 2, 1993.
236. Richards, supra note 81, at 126.
237. Argentina was listed on the watch list from 1989 to 1992. Argentina was then upgraded to
the priority watch list in 1993 and the priority foreign country list in 1994. Newby, supra note 188,
at 63. In 1995 Argentina was dropped to the watch list, but was singled out as one of the countries
that would be subject to additional review. Intellectual Property: No Countries Cited as Priority
VOL. 30, NO. 4
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION 857
quired compulsory licensing.238 Under this provision, a patent could lapse in
Argentina if not worked239 for two consecutive years. 2 4 This requirement was
virtually impossible for pharmaceutical industries to meet.24'
In November of 1994 the Argentine Senate passed a new patent protection
law, 242 which was also passed by the Argentine House of Representatives in
March of 1995.243 PhRMA officials and representatives of the USTR's Office
felt that the new law fell short of the requirements of the TRIPs agreement.244
PhRMA cited the deferral of pharmaceutical product protection, the absence of
pipeline protection, and the allowance of parallel importation into Argentina of
products sold by the patentee in other markets as its major concerns.245 In April
of 1995 Argentine President Carlos Menem introduced changes in the new draft
law through his presidential veto power.246 Menem spoke about the need to make
the bill "compatible with the GATT framework. 247 While both sides agreed
that the 1864 Argentine law was inadequate, the legislation remained in a "tug-of-
war" between the Argentine Congress and domestic drug companies on one side
and the Menem administration, the U.S. government, and foreign pharmaceutical
companies on the other side.248
On January 5, 1996, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor stated that
the Clinton administration was becoming "very impatient" with the failure of
the Argentine government to modernize its patent law and was considering initia-
Under Special 301 Announcement, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (May 3, 1995) [hereinafter, Special 301
Announcement]. Argentina remains on the watch list in 1996. Intellectual Property: USTR Says
China, Other Countries, Fail to Protect Intellectual Property, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily
(BNA) (May 2, 1996) [hereinafter USTR Says China].
238. Mossinghoff, supra note 70, at 313.
239. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
240. Mossinghoff, supra note 70, at 313.
241. Id.
242. Argentina: Argentine Official Defends Patent Law; U.S. Standards Not Likely to Be Met,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Mar. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Argentine Official Defends Patent Law].
243. Argentina's Patent Law: Pits Congress against U.S., Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, May 23,
1995 [hereinafter Argentina's Patent Law].
244. Argentine Official Defends Patent Law, supra note 242; see also GA TT: GA IT Treaty Would
Have Precedence over Argentine Patent Law, Ditella Says, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Mar. 23, 1995)
[hereinafter GAT Treaty].
245. GATT Treaty, supra note 244. The pharmaceutical industry estimates that it loses as much
as $200 million per year in Argentina from the pirating of its patents. CAFC Says, Genes Are Not
Obvious, BIOTECH PAT. NEWS, May 1, 1993. Another source cited $1 billion in annual losses to
pirates in Argentina within the pharmaceutical and software industries combined. Ehrmann, supra
note 235.
246. Argentina: Menem to Modify Argentine Patent Bill in Wake of U.S., European Criticism,
Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA) (Apr. 21, 1995).
247. Menem noted that "at least 10 aspects" of the approved patent bill did not adhere to GATT
guidelines. Id. Three areas of disapproval are (1) an eight-year transition period before protection
takes effect, (2) a requirement that drugs be produced in Argentina in order for their patent to be
valid, and (3) the power of the patent office to grant compulsory licenses. Argentina's Patent Law,
supra note 243.
248. Argentina's Patent Law, supra note 243.
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tion of a case against Argentina at the WTO. 249 The Argentine lawmakers defended
their legislation on February 27, 1996, indicating that it was fully consistent with
GATT provisions.250
President Menem signed a decree on March 22, 1996, providing patent protec-
tion. 251 The new law provides product patent protection for pharmaceuticals after
November of 2000, but fails to provide pipeline protection to existing products.252
The law also allows for compulsory licensing in the event of a lack of, or interrup-
tion in, the working of the product; anticompetitive practices; national security;
and patents of addition.253 Parallel imports are forbidden in principle, but the
wording is ambiguous.254
The USTR's Office states that the new law "fall[s] . . . short of adequate and
effective protection and fail[s] to achieve earlier Argentine assurances." 255 The
United States will seek further improvements and monitor the status of Argen-
tina.256
B. INDIA
Harvey E. Bale, Jr., senior vice president of the Pharmaceutical Research
257Manufacturers of America, commented on India in 1993 stating that "there
is no other country in the world which has played a more insidious and damaging
role for such a long period of time in terms of its total disregard for the norms
of intellectual property protection, especially for pharmaceutical patents., 2 51 In-
dia was placed on the USTR priority watch list in 1989 and 1990 and upgraded
to a priority foreign country in 1991 259 Many Indians view intellectual property
249. Patents: Argentine Government Said Working on Compromise Patent Legislation, Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 17, 1996).
250. Intellectual Property: Argentine Congressional Delegates Defend Law Passed by Legislation,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Feb. 28, 1996).
251. Intellectual Property: New Argentine Patent Regime Still Judged Sub-par, U.S. Executive
Says, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA) (Apr. 9, 1996).
252. Id.
253. Id. Working is defined as distribution and marketing sufficient to cover demand in the domestic
market. Id. Patents of addition are patents that represent an addition, improvement, modification, or
alteration of an existing patent subject matter. Robert H. Hammer I1, An Overview of Foreign Patent
Practice, ALI-ABA Course of Study Fundamentals of Patent Law and Practice 129, 136 (May 5,
1994).
254. Hammer, supra note 253.
255. USTR, Fact Sheets "Special 301" on Intellectual Property Rights and 1996 Title VII Deci-
sions, Apr. 9, 1996, available on the Internet, http://www.ustr.gov/reports/special/factsheets.html
[hereinafter USTR Fact Sheets].
256. Id.
257. This organization was formerly the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. Industry
Urges, supra note 156.
258. Id.
259. India remained a priority foreign country through 1994. Newby, supra note 188, at 63. In
1995 India was downgraded to the priority watch list, Special 301 Announcement, supra note 237.
India remains on the priority watch list in 1996. USTR Says China, supra note 237.
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provisions as "economic colonialism" and find exploitation in the fact that a
foreign company could enter a poor country to develop technology and then
obtain a patent for the technology and declare the resources private property .260
In 1988 India's patent law provided for only process patent availability in the
area of pharmaceuticals and provided no coverage in the area of biotechnology.261
The law also provided for compulsory licensing three years after issuance of a
patent if the "reasonable requirements of the public" were not satisfied.2 62 This
concept has been defined broadly under the Indian Patent Act, with great discretion
to the Controller of Patents.
263
India remained a priority foreign country from 1991 to 1993.264 A 1993 report
indicated that India had agreed to accept product patents in the area of pharmaceuti-
cals in hopes of attracting foreign investment.265 However, in March of 1995,
PhRMA President Gerald J. Mossinghoff stated that "India continues to serve
as a center for global patent piracy.' 2 66 While foreign businesses have few prob-
lems with the Indian copyright and trademark laws, patents continue to be an
area of concern, particularly in the area of pharmaceutical and agricultural prod-
ucts. 267 An Indian diplomat revealed that changes in India's intellectual property
protection were unlikely until after India's 1996 national elections. 26 The USTR's
Office has opened a formal investigation into India's failure to provide pharmaceu-
tical patents and has indicated that the United States will initiate formal consulta-
tions with India under the WTO dispute settlement procedures in the near future.269
C. TURKEY
Due to inadequate intellectual property laws, Turkey has remained on the
priority watch list since 1992.270 While Turkey's patent laws provide protection
260. Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 356.
261. R. Michael Gadbaw & Leigh A. Kenny, India, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Gadbaw
& Richards), supra note 1, at 201. Biotechnology protection is of particular concern to the pharmaceu-
tical industry. As of January 1992 only 15 biotechnology-based drugs had received FDA approval.
Biotechnology to Pioneer Drug Discovery in the Next Century, PHARMACEUTICAL Bus. NEWS FIN.
TIMEs Bus. INFO., LTD., Jan. 10, 1992, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 2207245. However,
biotechnology has contributed to both production technology and research in the pharmaceutical
industry. Id. According to the United States Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, biotech-
nology is likely to be the principal scientific driving force for the discovery of new drugs in the next
century. Id.
262. Gadbaw & Kenny, supra note 261, at 203.
263. Id.
264. India: Indian Intellectual Property Issues Called Less Problematic Than China's, Int'l Trade
Daily (BNA) (Mar. 9, 1995) [hereinafter Indian Intellectual Property].
265. India to Accept Drug Patents, 5 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. No. 8, 1993, at 33.
266. Indian Intellectual Property, supra note 264.
267. India: Patent Changes Called Unlikely Until After 1996 Election, Pat., Trademark & Copy-
right L. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 12, 1996).
268. Id.
269. Intellectual Property: U.S. Opens Investigation into Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
in India, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (July 16, 1996); USTR Fact Sheets, supra note 255.
270. USTR Fact Sheets, supra note 255.
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for pharmaceuticals, patents in this area will not be available before 1999.271
Accordingly, piracy of patented products in Turkey is considered widespread.272
D. BRAZIL
Opposition to intellectual property protection was at its peak in Brazil when
the government revoked patent protection for pharmaceutical products and pro-
cesses.273 In defending its policy on pharmaceutical protection, Brazil argued
that the low-income population would not be able to afford monopolists' prices
and would go without needed medications.274 In addition to opposition to the
exclusion of pharmaceutical protection, the requirement that a patent owner work
or exploit its patented invention in Brazil was a concern.275 Importation of the
276patented product into Brazil was not sufficient to show exploitation of the patent.
A third party could request compulsory licensing if the patent had not been
exploited within three years of issuance or if exploitation had been discontinued
for one year.277 In addition, the patent would lapse if it had not been exploited
271within four years of issuance or had been discontinued for a period of two years.
Brazil remained on the priority watch list from 1989 to 1993, when it was
upgraded to a priority foreign country.279 In 1990, USTR's Carla Hills stated that
Brazil must recognize patent protection in the area of pharmaceuticals "because it
is in the best interest of its own citizens, it will fuel the creativities of its own
entrepreneurs, and it will provide a welcome climate for investment from abroad,
which will bring in technology.', 280 The Brazilian pharmaceutical industry is
made up of 600 producers, of which 80 are subsidiaries of major drug companies,
and 15 of the subsidiaries are from the 16 largest drug companies in the United
271. Intellectual Property: Japan Could Face WTO Challenge over Copyright Dispute with U.S.,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Jan. 24, 1996) (article cites USTR praise and concerns with recent intellectual
property issues in Japan, Turkey, and other countries).
272. Id.
273. Timothy J. Richards, Brazil, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Gadbaw & Richards),
supra note 1, at 153. Brazil eliminated pharmaceutical product patents in 1945 and pharmaceutical
process patents in 1969. Corn, supra note 137, at 76.
274. Emmert, supra note 13, at 1327.
275. USTR Releases Annual Trade Report on Restrictions Around the World, Pat. Trademark &
Copyright Daily (BNA) (May 22, 1991) [hereinafter USTR Releases Annual Trade Report].
276. Richards, supra note 273, at 169.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 170.
279. Newby, supra note 188, at 63. In 1994 Brazil was not on the lists provided by the USTR's
Office. Id. In 1995 Brazil was placed back on the priority watch list as a country that would be
subject to review by the administration. Special 301 Announcement, supra note 237. The 1996 listing
by the USTR's Office downgraded Brazil to the watch list. USTR Fact Sheets, supra note 255.
280. Brazil: USTR Urges Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals; Industry Lukewarm, Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA) (June 14, 1990). The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
has referred to Brazil as the "global leader in opposition to patent protection" in the area of pharmaceu-
ticals. Corn, supra note 137, at 80.
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States.28 With these numbers in mind, it is easy to see why the U.S. pharmaceuti-
cal industry is interested in Brazilian protection.
A newly proposed Brazilian law would provide patent protection for pharma-
ceutical products and processes.2 82 In addition, the bill provides for a twenty-year
patent term that could be extended by five years to firms engaged in local manufac-
ture.28 3 In 1994 investigations into Brazil were ended when the USTR's Office
was assured that the Brazilian Congress would approve the government's new
intellectual property bill. 284 Due to progress in Brazil, the USTR's Office declined
to place Brazil on the priority foreign country list in 1995.285 However, Brazil
was singled out on the priority watch list as a country that would have special
review of intellectual property protection over the next year.286
The proposed bill, which was originally supposed to pass in June of 1994,
stalled in the Senate office.287 After three years of delay, the Senate approved
the bill in February of 1996.28 The issue of pipeline protection, which was
included in the final version of the law, was the principal reason for the delay
in passing the law.2 89 The bill passed the House on April 10, 1996, and will
become effective after a one-year transition period. 290 The USTR's Office called
the passage of the patent law an "admirable step" and downgraded Brazil to the
watch list for 1996.291
E. SINGAPORE
Singapore had not been designated to any of the three USTR lists prior to
1995 ;292 in 1995, Singapore was listed on the watch list 293 where it has remained
in 1996.294 Singapore grants patents under the U.K. Patents Act of 1977,295 and
therefore is the only country that does not exclude patents for pharmaceutical
products or processes.296 One concern seems to be that the Singapore government
281. Frischtak, supra note 69, at 90.
282. Gutterman, supra note 30, at 129. However, a 1992 amendment denies patents for drugs
on the "essential drugs" list of the World Health Organization. Id. at 131.
283. Id. at 130.




288. Brazil: Senate Approves Patent Bill; Lower House Passage Expected, Pat., Trademark &
Copyright L. Daily (BNA) (Apr. 5, 1996).
289. Id.
290. USTR Fact Sheets, supra note 255.
291. Id.
292. Newby, supra note 188, at 63.
293. Special 301 Announcement, supra note 237.
294. USTR Fact Sheets, supra note 255.
295. Schumann, supra note 4, at 187.
296. Timothy J. Richards & Leigh A. Kenny, Singapore, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(Gadbaw & Richards), supra note 1, at 311.
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is allowed to use pharmaceutical patents for making or importing drugs for govern-
ment hospitals or public medical institutions .297 While the Singapore government
is supposed to pay royalties to the patent holder in these instances, companies
have been unsuccessful in realizing these payments.298
Recently Glaxo, a British pharmaceutical company, opened a new pharmaceuti-
cal plant in Jurong, Singapore. 299 During the opening ceremonies, a senior official
expressed disappointment in the new Singapore Patent Bill.3 0 Of primary concern
is the allowance for parallel imports of all pharmaceutical products.30 '
F. COSTA RICA
Like Singapore, Costa Rica had never been listed on the USTR's Special 301
lists prior to 1995 . 302 In 1995, the country was placed on the watch list,30 3 and
it, too, remains on the watch list for 1996. 3o Costa Rican law provides that
pharmaceuticals may be patented, but only for one year and only so long as they
are patented and used in the home country.3 5 The United States is looking for
changes as the Costa Rican government implements its WTO obligations. 3°
G. CHINA
30 7
For many years Chinese law did not recognize patent protection for pharmaceu-
ticals, but recent changes to the law have resulted in the inclusion of patent
protection for pharmaceutical products. 30 ' The new 1993 amendment to the Chi-
nese law still provides for compulsory licensing.30 Under the new law, compul-
sory licensing can be triggered in a national emergency, an extraordinary state
of affairs, and in the public interest.3 0 In 1996 the USTR's Office identified
297. Schumann, supra note 4, at 187.
298. Richards & Kenny, supra note 296, at 329.
299. Singapore Patent Bill Criticized, supra note 114.
300. Id. The new bill was passed by Parliament in November 1994. Id.
301. Id.
302. Newby, supra note 188, at 63.
303. Special 301 Announcement, supra note 237.
304. USTR Fact Sheets, supra note 255.
305. Robert H. Stempler, Costa Rica: A Nirvana for Export Manufacturers? 4 TRANSNAT'L L.
201, 233 (1991).
306. USTR Fact Sheets, supra note 255.
307. China was first listed on the priority watch list in 1989 and 1990. In 1991 it was upgraded
to a priority foreign country for one year. In 1992, China was downgraded to the watch list but
went back to the priority watch list in 1993 and back to a priority foreign country in 1994. Newby,
supra note 188, at 63. In 1995, China was once again dropped to the watch list. Special 301 Announce-
ment, supra note 237.
308. Intellectual Property: Chinese Official Outlines Improvements in intellectual Property Protec-
tion, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Apr. 18, 1994).
309. Giunta & Shang, supra note 34, at 354.
310. Id.
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China as a priority foreign country for failing to stop production and importation
of infringing goods, primarily in the CD, video, and CD-ROM industries.31'
H. EGvr
Egypt was first placed on the Special 301 watch list in 1989.312 Egypt was
upgraded to the priority watch list in 1992 and remained there until 1994, when
it was downgraded to the watch list once again.313 In April of 1994, USTR's
Mickey Kantor stated that Egypt would remain on the priority watch list due to
inadequate protection of pharmaceuticals.314 In 1995 the USTR's Office placed
Egypt on the watch list,315 where it has remained while the United States continues
to urge Egypt to enact a modem patent law with protection for pharmaceuticals.3 6
I. KOREA
Korea's 1982 patent laws excluded patent protection for pharmaceuticals and
provided for compulsory licensing if the patent was not worked in the country
for three years.317 In 1986 Korea entered into an agreement with the United States
whereby patent protection would be provided for pharmaceutical products. 8
Despite this agreement, Korea did not amend its patent law to provide protection
for pharmaceuticals. 31 9 The Korean law severely limits the use of compulsory
licensing.32 ° Under the law, compulsory licenses can only be issued after reason-
able efforts have been made to negotiate with the patentee, but even then the
requesting party is required to pay royalties.32'
J. THAILAND
Thailand's 1979 Patent Act excluded patent protection for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. 32 2 In addition, the law provided for compulsory licenses after three years
if the patentee failed to manufacture or sell the product in the domestic market
311. USTR Says China, supra note 237.
312. Newby, supra note 188, at 63.
313. Id.
314. Middle East: Commerce Secretary Brown Says Arab Boycott Is Crumbling, Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA) (Jan. 25, 1994).
315. Special 301 Announcement, supra note 237.
316. USTR Fact Sheets, supra note 255.
317. Mossinghoff, supra note 70, at 316.
318. Record of Understanding on Intellectual Property Rights between the Republic of Korea and
the United States of America, August 29, 1986, available in WESTLAW, 1986 WL 233694 (Treaty).
319. USTR Releases Annual Trade Report, supra note 275. Korea was listed on the watch list in
1990 and 1991. Korea was then upgraded to the priority watch list, where in 1996 it remains. Newby,
supra note 188, at 63; Special 301 Announcement, supra note 237; USTR Fact Sheets, supra note
255.
320. Mossinghoff, supra note 70, at 317.
321. Id.
322. Schumann, supra note 4, at 190.
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or if the product was sold at "unreasonably high prices." 32 3 Thailand has been
listed on the Special 301 priority lists since 1989.324 At first Thailand resisted
the demands of the United States, hoping the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
325of GATT would ward off Special 301 sanctions, particularly with respect to
pharmaceutical patents where the government was under considerable opposition
from local industry and academic circles.326
In February of 1992 the Thai Assembly passed a draft bill that extended patent
coverage to pharmaceuticals.327 The compulsory license provisions were also
revised to provide that the licensee must show an attempt to obtain a license from
the patentee and the patentee must be given notice and an opportunity to be
heard.328
V. Conclusion
Over the years since the United States first instigated use of Special 301 by
the USTR's Office, significant progress has been seen, particularly with the
newly industrialized countries such as Korea, Hong Kong, Brazil, and Thailand.329
The United States has also been a driving force behind the inclusion of strong
intellectual property protection in the various multilateral trade agreements,' 3
which has led to significant changes in many developing countries' intellectual
property laws. However, resentment has developed against the United States for
use of Special 301 sanctions.331
Intellectual property rights represent a significant asset to industry, particularly
in industries such as pharmaceuticals with high investment and research and
development costs. Nevertheless, the industrialized countries must be sensitive
to the concerns of lesser-developed nations and be willing to understand the time
and costs involved in setting up major intellectual property systems. Worldwide
patent law harmonization might be an avenue that would encourage participation
of lesser-developed countries, but the industrialized countries such as the United
States must be willing to change some aspects of their current laws.
323. Id. at 191.
324. Kirchanski, supra note 3, at 588. Thailand entered the USTR lists on the priority watch list
in 1989. In 1991 it was upgraded to a priority foreign country, where it remained until 1994. It was
then dropped to the priority watch list for 1994. Newby, supra note 188, at 63. In 1995 Thailand
dropped to its lowest point in the history of the USTR listings by being placed on the watch list.
Special 301 Announcement, supra note 237. Thailand remains on the watch list for 1996. USTR
Fact Sheets, supra note 255.
325. Kirchanski, supra note 3, at 591.
326. Id. at 592. Thai officials stated that the United States must understand that the Thai government
must also act in the best interests of Thailand. Id.
327. Id. At that time it was unclear how biotechnology patents would be handled. Id. at 593.
328. Id. at 594.
329. Merges, supra note 35, at 241.
330. See Chang, supra note 27, at 227.
331. Id. at 222.
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Piracy of products such as pharmaceuticals can lead to deadly results and,
therefore, needs to be controlled. The pharmaceutical industry needs protection
from foreign piracy, and the use of Special 301 should be available to assist
such industries in markets with extensive counterfeiting and piracy of products.
However, Special 301 should be used sparingly, and continued strong action
should be taken with multilateral options. In addition, private industry must
take a more active role in promoting the value of intellectual property rights in
lesser-developed countries. Industry must realize that support in promoting the
resources available in developing countries will provide stronger incentive for
those countries to protect intellectual property.
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